Before you start the game, make sure you know what the objective is and how to win. Also a good idea to make sure everyone agrees on what those things are – I once ‘won’ a chess game against a seeded player. I stink at chess but I defined ‘win’ as ‘not losing in ten moves or less’. I kept him busy for thirty minutes – then he figured out that I didn’t have a winning strategy, just a stalling strategy. Game over five moves later – he won the match; I won my goal.

Redefining win can occasionally be a useful trick – but just like that chess match, you can usually only get away with it once. After that everyone knows the trick and it only works if you pout. Needless to say, nation-states don’t get a lot of leverage from their pouting skills.

Declare victory and go home is sometimes the best option – but the problem is that you have to at least make it look like a win. That’s extremely hard to do when you’ve lost men and munitions and have only a retreat to show for it. It’s even harder when you’ve managed to tick off half the planet with the other half none too happy about it either. Nations, like people, have expectations – and when your little war mucks up their supply chains, or worse, critical supplies, they are NOT inclined to let you just pretend nothing happened.

Also, propaganda at home doesn’t work nearly as well as you want to believe. People notice when you promise X and somehow they end up with Y. They notice when shelves are empty and the jobs dry up. They notice that nothing you said proved to be true – and they notice faster than you thought they would.

So, what options are left?

Actually win in the normal sense of military victory – forcibly take control of the Ukraine. Since losing any shot of taking the capital, that is no longer in the cards. Without Kyiv, Russia cannot stop the flow of Western munitions into Ukraine. Ukraine has more guys who are all highly motivated along with a ton of guys much more experienced – as long as they are supplied and have grounds for rest and training, there’s no pushing them out of their homeland. Since Europe has taken a rather extreme dislike of the Russian invasion, there’s not going to be a problem supplying and funding the Ukrainians.

Option 2 – Take the Donbas and the southern corridor. This is the option du jour – it’s just not a whole lot more likely than what was behind Door Number 1. While it has the potential to fracture some of the NATO resolve, most of that potential was lost in Bucha. Germany isn’t happy to face a recession but they are a lot less happy to even indirectly have their interests tied to Russian war crimes. NATO’s internal issues won’t save the Russian military.

But, but, massive numbers, big gun thingies! Surely the Russians can make a comeback in the second half, right? If the support dries up, sure. If Russia gets its act together, maybe. If Ukraine proves as adept with heavy weapons as it has been with javelins, not a chance.

The thing about manpower and munitions is that employing them also costs money – and right now, Russia’s economy is cratering. Its warships can’t refuel in the Mediterranean because no other nations want to deal with them, let alone in rubles. Having to make a show of contesting the Kirils and scaring Finland only runs up the tab. The Russian bear is currently more tom turkey – only without as many feathers to puff up.

That sounds easier than it really is – this is not going to be fun for anyone – but Ukraine can’t afford to lose that much strategic territory and NATO can’t afford to let Russia take it. There will be noise about appeasement but muted – Russia has its own insanely primitive warfighting to thank for that. While Russia can make life miserable for Ukraine, it’s iffy whether or not they even have the capacity to take and hold the territory.

Option 3: Return to pre-invasion borders. Probably the best option for Russia and the least likely to occur. Best for Russia is not best for the Russian government. I’m dubious that it matters much long term, but it matters to the 150 – 200 or so of the Russian elite that actually are in power. Looking like chumps is not great for long term political stability or maintaining power even in the bizarro world that is Russian politics. That’s not to imply a unified elite – there’s good evidence they aren’t – but it won’t matter unless Putin decides to step down (in other words, it won’t matter for the foreseeable future).

Option 4: Lose the war. Obviously, not an option Russia will chose but one it may get stuck with. While the Russian elite see an existential threat, most Russians don’t. Even those who initially supported the war may not be so keen as it becomes obvious that they didn’t get the full story. Those who don’t see the point won’t be eager to sign up – or show up – when Russia needs more manpower. Russian corruption is legendary – and has a multi-faceted effect on their military. The same guys stealing cars in Ukraine have likely been mailing home ‘surplus’ for decades. Hey, when your missiles never get used, who’s gonna miss a replacement part or ten? Add in a top down leadership that limits the flexibility on the ground and you have a delicious brew of Loser Soup. Remember, losing is always an option.

That brings us to the final option: Go nuclear. Here’s the thing – threatening nuclear attacks might produce results you want. Actually making a nuclear attack ends your existence – and your country while its at it. In the most technical – and least desirable – sense of the word ‘win’ nuclear war is winnable. Just not for Russia. The US would still be standing the next day; Russia would be a smoldering ruin. That’s assuming most of their warheads/delivery systems work – which probably isn’t a good assumption. The US simply has more on the ball – and an actual blue water navy. The US would be hurt BADLY – but it would still be standing. Russia, not at all. Pyrrhic victories aren’t worth the pain – let alone the price.

All things told, maybe the Russians should just steal a few Ukrainian tractors, declare victory and get out while they can.